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In this partial equilibrium and static model, the impact of envi-
ronmentalism on two countries' environmental policies is presented.
First, the only (indirect) way environmentalists inuence the choice of
pollution taxes is through a negative term in the welfare function in
Home. It is dened as passive environmentalism (PE). Second, this ar-
ticle is a rst attempt to consider domestic environmentalists lobbying
a foreign government. It is dened as active environmentalism (AE).
Our contribution is threefold. We emphasize rst that the way environ-
mentalists act is paramount to study the consequences of their actions.
Passive or active environmentalism have very dierent impacts on en-
vironmental policies. Second, we show that lobbying activities can
be counter-productive for environmentalists. Third, we characterize
cases in which the presence of environmentalists has a non-ambiguous
positive impact on welfare.
Keywords: environmentalism, lobby groups, positive environ-
mental economics, strategic environmental policy,
JEL classication: H23, D72
Abbreviations: PE (passive environmentalism) and AE (active environ-
mentalism)
11 Introduction
In the political economy of environmental policies, recent contributions have
emphasized one specic characteristic of environmentalists, namely that they
are negatively aected by pollution abroad (Aidt 2005, Canton 2008). In
an international context, this literature has notably been able to demon-
strate that the presence of environmentalists is not necessarily synonymous
with less pollution or more stringent environmental policies. In those mod-
els, environmentalists are lobbying domestic government. However, the ex-
plicit inuence of environmentalists via the domestic welfare function or the
opportunity to directly lobby the foreign government remain unanswered
questions. This article is an attempt to ll this gap.
In developed countries, surveys and polls regularly demonstrate that
the environment is among the top priorities. For instance, a poll con-
ducted in 2008 in Canada by the Environics Institute showed that Canadi-
ans see the environment as the most pressing problem facing today's world.
Meanwhile, Eurobarometer indicates that 62% of European citizens con-
sider global warming as one of the most serious issues now facing the planet.
These opinion surveys, as indicative as they are, do not necessarily guarantee
a direct involvement from citizens. This can take the form of belonging to
an environmental organization. List & Sturm (2005) report that the number
of members in the three largest environmental NGOs in U.S. states (Green-
peace, the Sierra Club and the National Wildlife Federation) between 1987
and 2000 varies from 0.25 percent of the population in Mississippi to just
over 2 percent in Vermont.
2Therefore, studying the inuence of environmentalism clearly supposes
to dierentiate two specic cases. First, passive environmentalism (PE) is
dened as situations where environmentalists only inuence the political de-
cisions through their preferences. For instance, a government maximizing
social welfare must consider the impact of its decisions on foreign pollution if
some of the citizens are environmentalists. Second, domestic environmental-
ists may lobby a foreign government. It is dened as active environmentalism
(AE) and can take the form of donating to an environmental NGO trying
to inuence environmental policies in developing countries. Studying the
inuence of passive or active environmentalism and how they dier forms
the core of the paper.
This article builds on two strands of the literature. First, the article con-
siders two countries, Home and Foreign, that choose simultaneously an envi-
ronmental policy. They compete strategically for the production of one good
sold on a third market (Spencer & Brander 1983, Brander & Spencer 1985).
The production process creates a by-product, pollution, that results in an
environmental damage. Cases of local and global pollution are considered.
A regulator maximizing local welfare tends to use environmental policies so
as to give a competitive advantage to local polluting rms. Most of the
time, this gives rise to lower levels of taxation than without strategic incen-
tives (Barrett 1994, Ulph 1996). Our approach is the rst to consider the
presence of environmentalists in Home. In addition to the environmental
damage created to each citizen by local pollution, environmentalists' util-
ity decreases when foreign pollution increases. We present how a change in
3passive environmentalism aects environmental policies and the impact of
environmentalists on welfare.
The second part of the article presents the inuence of active environ-
mentalism on the choice of a politically optimal environmental tax. An
incumbent government is considered, maximizing its chances of being re-
elected. In this context, its objective function encompasses both social wel-
fare and political contributions. Political contributions are proposed by an
environmental group in a two-stage game. Environmentalists move rst and
simultaneously oer the government contribution schedules that specify the
payment to be made to the government as a function of the pollution tax.
Taking the contribution schedules and the economic behavior of the private
sector as given, the government moves second and implements the politically
optimal pollution tax. This standard game was rst applied to environmen-
tal policies by Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt (1998). More recently, in an
open economy context, Conconi (2003) and Aidt (2005) discuss cases where
environmentalists are in favour of a decrease in environmental taxation. Pol-
lution leakage in the rst analysis and a direct interest in foreign pollution
in the second explain these unintuitive results. Canton (2008) extends their
approach in the presence of an eco-industry1 and looks at potential coalitions
between dierent lobby groups. However, none of the previous contributions
has considered the possibility for the green lobby to inuence the Foreign
government.
Even though such countries as Canada (The Canada Elections Act),
Russia or the U.K. prohibit candidates and parties from receiving campaign
contributions from abroad, there exists a large number of justications to
4the possibility of cross-border political donations (Endoh 2005). According
to Austin & Tjernstr om (2003),\among 111 countries which are categorized
as \free" and \partly free" concerning political rights and civil liberties in
the 2002 Freedom House Index, and whose data are reported, only about
one third (40 countries) have regulations totally banning political donations
from foreign sources." Furthermore, foreign lobbies do have an impact on
trade regulation, at least in the US (Gawande et al. 2004). In the theo-
retical literature, Grossman & Helpman (1995) are the only ones to discuss
foreign lobbying activities. As far as environmental policies are concerned,
no specic contribution has been made.
The following insights can be derived from the model. First, the way
environmentalists act is paramount to understand their inuence. More
passive or active environmentalism can have signicantly dierent eects on
countries' policies and welfares. Second, lobbying activities can be counter-
productive for environmentalists. They may lobby for a more stringent envi-
ronmental policy abroad, the result being a decrease in the foreign pollution
tax. So, in contrast with the conventional wisdom on lobbies, an interest
group can be hurt by its own power. Finally, we characterize cases where
the presence of environmentalists has a non-ambiguous positive impact on
one country's welfare, whether it is Foreign, or rather surprisingly, Home.
There is usually a trade-o between the environment and polluting rms'
prots. However, we predict that in some cases, more environmentalism can
lead to a win-win situation for a country, as both the environment and its
rm's prots improve.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the economic model
5and notably rms' decisions and their impact on welfare. In section 3, envi-
ronmental taxes are determined when both countries act non-cooperatively.
Section 5 adds the possibility for environmentalists to lobby the foreign gov-
ernment. Section 6 concludes.
2 The economic model
There are two countries in the economy, Home and Foreign, the superscript
 standing for foreign variables. Both countries are perfectly similar, except
for the presence of environmentalists in Home.
2.1 Firms' decisions
As in Barrett (1994), there exists a polluting sector where two polluting rms
(one in Home, one in Foreign) compete strategically on a world market. Both
polluting rms produce a given commodity X = x + x at a world price P.
The world inverse demand function P(X) is such that P(X) = A   X.
For convenience, it is assumed that production costs are linear, i.e. c0(x) =
c0(x) = c, where c is a constant. This activity generates some pollution
which is summarized by an emission function (x). One unit of production
creates one unit of pollution. Each unit of pollution is taxed at a common
rate t at home and at a rate t abroad. From this point of view, the local
polluting rm maximizes the following prot function over x:
max
x
 = P(x + x)x   cx   tx (1)
6The rst-order condition of prot maximization is such that A x 2x 
c   t = 0. Symmetrically, the foreign rm chooses its production level such
that A x 2x c t = 0. Second order conditions are always satised,
i.e.  2 < 0. Thus, the implicit optimal levels of production for the local
and the foreign rms are, respectively:
x =
P(X)   c   t

x =
P(X)   c   t

Our analysis is focused on interior equilibria and it is therefore always
assumed that the demand function is such that P(X)   c   t > 0 and
P(X)   c   t > 0. From these optimal levels of production, comparative
statics is derived by totally dierentiating rst-order conditions.
 dx   2dx   dt = 0
 dx   2dx = 0















It is standard in the strategic policy literature (Spencer & Brander 1983,
Brander & Spencer 1985) to ignore the impact of the policy on consumers.
Therefore, the good is not consumed domestically. There is no consumer
7surplus and in addition to rms' prots, the only other elements of the wel-
fare function are the environmental damage and some lump-sum transfers.2
The environmental damage in Home is composed of two parts. First, the
damage suered by local citizens. Second, their perception of the damage
for foreign citizens. Therefore, we have:
D(E) =  E(X)   E(X) (2)
where E(X) = (1   )x + x stands for the amount of local pollution and
E(X) = (1   )x + x is the overall pollution in the foreign country. Fol-
lowing Conconi (2003) and Canton (2008), domestic citizens are aected
by foreign emissions through a parameter  2 [0;1=2]. If  = 0, pollu-
tion is purely local whereas if  = 1=2, pollution is purely global. is the
marginal environmental damage of each unit of pollution, strictly positive
and constant.  is the disutility incurred to environmentalists by each unit
of pollution abroad. All citizens are assumed to be environmentalists, so a
change in  is equivalent to a change in the marginal disutility.3 Citizens
receive a lump-sum transfer R(:), nanced from the revenue of the pollution
tax. Then, welfare in Home is:
W(t;t) =  (x(t;t);x(t;t))   E(X(t;t))   E(X(t;t)) + R(t) (3)
W(t;t) = (P(X)   c   (1   )   )x   ( + (1   ))x (4)
The foreign country is symmetric to the domestic one, except that its citizens
only care about local pollution. In other words, they are not negatively
8aected by pollution abroad.4 So, Foreign welfare is:
W(t;t) =  (x(t;t);x(t;t))   E(X(t;t)) + R(t) (5)
W(t;t) = (P(X)   c   (1   ))x   x (6)
2.3 Benchmark: no strategic competition
As a benchmark, the decision of an international agency is presented. Only
overall prots and global pollution matter, and so all strategic interactions
disappear.5 Overall welfare is:
WG = W + W
= (x;x) + (x;x)   X   (x + (1   )x) + R(:) + R(:)
To keep things comparable, the international agency is allowed to discrimi-
nate between countries and to choose a dierent tax in Home and in Foreign.
Maximizing the overall welfare with regard to t and t yields the following
implicit optimal taxes:
tG = x +  + (3   1)
t
G = x +  + (2   3)
Three eects inuence the choice of the optimal taxes in both countries.
First, a positive substitute strategic eect, that considers the impact of the
tax on foreign production. Second, a positive impact related to the marginal
9damage of pollution, identical in both countries. Finally, the inuence of en-
vironmentalists. Notice that taxes in both countries are identical if pollution
is global. When pollution is local, the direct eect is to induce a reduction
in the domestic tax and an increase in the foreign tax. However, this has an
impact on production levels as well and indirectly aects the environmental
policy stringency.
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The impact of  is straightforward. When it increases, it results in more
stringent environmental policies and lower pollution. However, the impact
of a change in environmentalists' disutility is less clear. First, this depends
on the kind of pollution considered but above all, this is inuenced by the
demand for the polluting good. In fact,  3 + 22 + 4 is positive when
2 > 1 and negative otherwise. Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics
based on the slope of the demand function:
<INSERT TABLE 1>
10The slope has no impact on the results when pollution is global but
comparative statics can change when pollution is local. The intuitive result,
where more environmentalists' disutility induces an increase in the foreign
tax and a decrease in the domestic one, only happens when demand is at,
with  < 1. On the contrary, when the demand curve is steeper, the indirect
eect of more environmentalists' disutility dominates, and it becomes more
protable to increase the domestic tax and decrease the foreign one. Notice
that in this case, overall emissions would increase.
The non-cooperative case is now presented, where both countries choose
simultaneously their own optimal environmental tax. The cooperative case
is used as a benchmark.
3 Strategic environmental policies with passive en-
vironmentalists






































11In Foreign, the strategic environmental tax rate is given by the following
condition:
dW



















dt = 0 (8)
Using the envelope theorem and optimal values of production in both coun-



















Two important changes appear compared to the benchmark case. First,
the tax is not identical anymore between countries when pollution is global.
Second, the substitute strategic eect is now being replaced by a pure rent-
seeking eect, where an increase in the domestic tax negatively aects local
rm's prots through a lower production level. It is this eect that is now
present in the implicit expression of both environmental taxes. As long
as the demand function is not specied, the explicit form of environmental
policies cannot be deduced. However, comparative statics can be performed.
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The impact of  on the choice of environmental policies is relatively straight-
forward. An increase in the marginal damage involves more (less) stringent
environmental policies as long as 2 < 6 (2 > 6). Strategic competition im-
plies that as demand tends to be elastic enough, more environmental damage
can lead to an increase in overall emissions. It is more protable to decrease
taxes in this context, as this has an important positive impact on rms'
prots, even though this means more pollution.7 The analysis of the impact
of a change in passive environmentalism is more complex and necessitates
to dierentiate between local and global pollution.
3.1 Strategic taxes and local pollution
Table 2 summarizes the impact of a change in passive environmentalism on
pollution taxes and production patterns in both countries. Comparative
statics is directly inuenced by the slope of the demand curve.
13<INSERT TABLE 2>
The two-case scenario of an international agency leads room to a multiple-
case scenario, where it becomes more complicated to predict the inuence of
passive environmentalism. A few remarks can nevertheless be added. First,
the intuitive solution, where more PE means a higher foreign tax and a
lower domestic tax still remains true when the demand curve is relatively
at(2 < 2). As demand becomes steeper, other scenarios are possible, in-
cluding more or less pollution in both countries. Notice that the worst-case
scenario for the environment when considering an increase in the marginal
environmental damage (2 > 6) is now the most favourable scenario with
more PE. What was initially a race-to-the-bottom due to a symmetric in-
crease in the marginal damage is now transformed to a race towards more
stringent environmental policies.
3.2 Strategic taxes and global pollution
Table 3 summarizes the consequences of a change in PE when pollution is
global.
<INSERT TABLE 3>
Compared to local pollution, the signs of the comparative statics are re-
versed when presenting the consequences of a change in PE. Two interesting
results can be isolated. First, the inuence of more passive environmentalism
is more similar to the case of a variation in , especially when we consider
the impact on overall emissions. As long as 2 < 6, pollution decreases.
14There is no tradeo for the regulator between emissions in Home and in
Foreign as they both have a transboundary impact. Second, it is now pos-
sible to characterize situations where Home or Foreign can unambiguously
benet from the presence of environmentalists. The following proposition
summarizes the results.
Proposition 1 (i) Contrary to the decision made by an international agency,
when pollution is global and countries compete strategically, taxes are not
identical anymore. (ii) When 2 < 2 (resp. 2 2]2;4[), the domestic (resp.
foreign) tax is higher than the foreign (resp. domestic) one, but global pol-
lution decreases, which results in an unambiguous increase in Foreign (resp.
Home) welfare.
The inuence of PE on welfare is interesting to discuss. It is usually consid-
ered that environmentalism supposes a trade-o between protecting the en-
vironment and defending the polluting industry's prots. What this propo-
sition shows is that when pollution is global, in some cases, strategic inter-
actions between the two countries can imply a win-win situation, either for
Home or for Foreign. It is expected that the environment should improve in
Foreign with more PE, but when rms' prots increase as well, this shows
that Foreign can now rely on another country to internalize its externality,
meanwhile focusing on increasing the competitive advantage of its industry.
Furthermore, more local citizens negatively aected by the environment
abroad may actually mean an increase in Home welfare. This can be seen
as another form of transfer paradox introduced in development economics.
Bhagwati et al. (1983), among others, have shown that a donor country
15may benet from its interests in a foreign country's welfare by giving some
foreign aid to this recipient country. Here, a country benets from caring
about the environment abroad as it can result in lower global emissions and
a more competitive local polluting industry, selling more products on world
markets.
This analysis of passive environmentalism was only a rst step in our
analysis of environmentalists' behaviour. In order to perform a more com-
prehensive analysis of environmentalism, a more active behaviour is now
considered. As far as we know, this is the rst attempt to consider the
impact of a domestic green lobby on a foreign country.
4 Politically optimal taxes with active environ-
mentalists
In this section the choice of the foreign pollution tax may deviate from the
social welfare maximization policy. Environmentalists oer contributions to
the foreign government trying to maximize its chances of being reelected
(Grossman & Helpman 1994). Let M(t) be the contribution of environ-
mentalists if the policy chosen is t. The payo function vp of the politician
becomes:
vp = W(t) + M(t) (11)
where  is the political weight given to the economy's welfare. Following
Schulze & Ursprung (2001),  can be interpreted as the weight given by the
16government to aggregate social welfare relative to bribes. This is a useful
measure of government corruptibility.
The way environmentalists form a lobby group and overpass the free-
riding problem is not considered. Environmentalists are functionally spe-
cialized.8
4.1 The political game
Environmentalists move rst and oer the government a contribution sched-
ule that species the payment to be made to the government as a function
of the pollution tax. Environmentalists make contributions up to the point
where the benet on their pay-o function of the resulting change in eco-
nomic policies is oset exactly by the marginal cost of the contributions.
Taking the contribution schedule and the economic behaviour of the private
sector as given, the government moves second and implements the politically
optimal pollution tax.
Bernheim & Winston (1986) characterize the equilibrium for a menu
auction problem with a nite set of actions. Fredriksson (1997) precises the
conditions ensuring the existence of a truthful equilibrium. It is notably
shown that the shapes of the lobbies' contribution schedules reveal the true
preferences in the neighborhood of the equilibrium. This notion of truthful-
ness is extended to dene a truthful contribution schedule, that everywhere
reects the true preferences of the lobby. Players bear essentially no cost
from playing truthful strategies, because the set of best responses to any
strategies played by one's opponents includes a strategy that is truthful.
174.2 Environmentalists' contribution to the pollution tax
The proportion of organized environmentalists belonging to the lobby group
is   1. The menu auctions of environmentalists depend on the impact of
a change in the foreign tax on pollution, including pollution at home. Their
gross payo function vE is:
vE = B   V E = B   [((1   ) + )x + ( + (1   ))x] (12)
where B is the budget constraint of the lobby. The policy preference of the
environmental group is determined by the sign of the derivative:
dvE
dt =  [((1   ) + )
dx
dt + ( + (1   ))
dx
dt ] (13)
Using the optimal values presented in the previous section yields:
dvE




Proposition 2 (i) When pollution is global, environmentalists always push
for an increase in the foreign pollution tax. (ii) When pollution is local,
environmentalists only push for an increase in the foreign pollution tax if
 > 
2
When pollution is global, it is always in the interest of environmentalists
to push for more stringent environmental policies, as it is the only way to
reduce the environmental damage. However, when pollution is local, envi-
ronmentalists consider both the impact on Foreign pollution and on Home
18pollution. An increase in the foreign tax rises local pollution. Thus, they
have to value enough foreign pollution to push for an increase in environ-
mental standards in that country.
4.3 The politically optimal environmental tax
In this model, the incumbent government maximizes its own political payo
function. Thus, the socially optimal policy is balanced according to the
auctions menu proposed by lobby groups to maximize the following payo
function:
vp = W(t) + M(t) (15)
So, the government actually determines the politically optimal pollution tax
as follows:
dvg




dt = 0 (16)
Developing this expression and rewriting it in the same way than the socially











((3   1) + (2   3)) (17)
The implicit expression of the optimal tax in Home does not change com-
pared to the case with no lobbying. However, through strategic interactions
between the two countries, the presence of lobbying activities has an impact
on its reaction function.
194.3.1 Impact of a change in AE when PE remains constant
First, the impact of a change in the lobby size is studied, maintaining con-
stant the inuence of passive environmentalism, i.e. the disutility incurred




2 ((1   3) + (3   2))





2(2   3)((1   3) + (3   2))
(12   82 + 4)
(19)
Local pollution The previous sub-section has demonstrated that when
pollution is local, environmentalists' behaviour diers according to marginal
damage and disutility. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the comparative statics
given the value of  and :
<INSERT Table 4>
<INSERT Table 5>
In scenario 1, environmentalists push for a decrease in the foreign tax
whereas in scenario 2, they push for an increase in the Foreign tax. There-
fore, it is not surprising that the comparative statics is the exact opposite
from one scenario to another.
Global pollution When pollution is global, environmentalists always push
for an increase in the foreign pollution tax and we nd the same results than
in Table 5.
20Two interesting insights must be considered based on this comparative
statics. The rst one is the object of the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When 2 2]2;3[[]6;+1[, an increase in the size of environ-
mentalists is counter-productive as the foreign environmental policy varies
against environmentalists' interests.
This proposition underlines that in some cases, the foreign tax does not vary
according to the way environmentalists lobby. The current literature focuses
on cases where environmentalists do not necessarily push for more stringent
environmental policies (Conconi 2003, Aidt 2005, Canton 2008). We also
characterize similar cases in Proposition 2, but our analysis goes beyond
that as it is demonstrated that environmentalists can be hurt by their own
power. Strategic interaction between the two countries may mean that an
increase in active environmentalism can hurt their interests by decreasing
(resp. increasing) the tax they would have otherwise liked to see increase
(resp. decrease).
The second important element of this analysis is that the way environ-
mentalists can act is paramount to study the consequences of their action.
In fact, the impact of more AE with constant PE is signicantly dierent
on environmental policies than what it is with more PE without AE. For
instance, when pollution is global or  > 
2, the impact on world emissions
is exactly the opposite. These results could be used to make a distinction
between PE and AE when environmentalists' inuence is measured empiri-
cally.
214.3.2 The inuence of more PE when AE is constant
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12   82 + 4 +
2

(2   3)(3   2)
12   82 + 4 (21)
The following proposition summarizes the impact of the presence of AE
on a change in PE.
Proposition 4 If active environmentalism is strong enough, the impact of
a change in PE can be reversed compared to the no-lobby situation. When
pollution is local, a necessary condition is 2 > 3 and when pollution is
global, a necessary condition is 2 < 3.
Proof: Table 6 summarizes the necessary and sucient conditions.
<INSERT TABLE 6>
This proposition illustrates again that how environmentalists behave is
important to study the consequences of their actions. The consequences of a
rise in environmental consciousness in one country will be dierent whether
or not there exists a small group in that population already taking active
behaviors by lobbying the foreign government.
5 Concluding remarks
The aim of the paper is to rene the theoretical analysis of environmental-
ism, when environmentalists are dened as negatively aected by pollution
22abroad. Their inuence is illustrated considering both passive and active en-
vironmentalism. Passive behaviour is considered by studying the impact on
optimal taxation of environmentalists' disutility in one of the country's wel-
fare function when two countries compete strategically. Active environmen-
talism consists in the environmentalists' ability to overpass the free-riding
problem and to create a lobby oering political contributions to the foreign
government. This is the rst attempt to analyze the lobbying of a foreign
government and to compare these results to the implication of a passive
behavior.
This approach notably emphasizes that the way environmentalists be-
have matters, as results are signicantly dierent given the case studied.
It has also been shown that lobbying activities can be counter-productive
for environmentalists. In fact, a stronger green lobby can induce an envi-
ronmental policy chosen in the foreign country that has adverse eects on
environmentalists' utility. Finally, we are able to characterize cases in which
the presence of environmentalists has a non-ambiguous positive impact on
welfare. Foreign, and more surprisingly Home, can unambiguously benet
from environmentalism as in some cases, it will result in less pollution and
more polluting industry's prots.
This analysis could be rened in various ways. First, one might try and
answer the traditional question with regard to how and why environmen-
talists manage to form lobbies. Second, it would be interesting to present
a case where environmentalists can both lobby at home and abroad. In
particular, it is not clear how they would split their political contributions
between the two governments. Prat & Rustichini (2003) oer the theoreti-
23cal conditions to nd an equilibrium in a multi-principal multi-agent game
but how this can be applied to the simultaneous choice of environmental
policies remains an unanswered question. Finally, one important question
concerns environmentalists' motivations. They could care about pollution
abroad because they are paternalist or because they are aware of an inef-
cient political system abroad and they want to try and compensate this
ineciency. Investigating this question would denitely help to understand
the consequences of their actions.
Notes
1The eco-industry consists of activities that measure, prevent, limit, minimize or correct
environmental damages (OECD 1999)
2The presence of consumers would only add one more incentive for regulators not to
tax too much polluters as the polluting oligopoly is already producing less than what is
optimal for consumers (Barnett 1980). Adding consumers in the model does not modify
the main results.
3If environmentalists do not form the entire population, then a change in  can either
be interpreted as a variation in the marginal utility or in the percentage of the population
aected by foreign population.
4The fact that two otherwise perfectly identical countries dier only due to the presence
of environmentalists in one of them can be seen as an ad-hoc assumption. Understanding
the emergence and motivations of environmentalists is not the object of the paper though,
and is left as a possible extension of the model.
5We ignore again the impact on consumers not so much because we do not think that
an international agency would not consider consumer surplus but because it is the way to
emphasize the role played by the slope of the demand curve in the model, even without
strategic interactions. See below.
246Our specication of the dierent functions of the model ensures that both welfare
functions are quasi-concave.
7We nd qualitatively similar results when we introduce consumers in the model.
8See Olson (1965) for a discussion on the logic of collective action. \While examples
of lobby groups with multiple goals can be found, empirical studies seem to show that
pressure groups are highly specialized" (Aidt 2005).
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Table 6: Reversed results for a change in PE in case of AE
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